if I read between the lines of this @grsecurity post… PaX doesn’t have userland stack proving and thus isn’t immune, despite claim @ start?
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what probing do you mean? the kernel doesn't do anything like that, it enforces a heap-stack gap instead (in PaX since 2010AD).
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how large a gap?
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it's in the advisory, did you read it? ;)
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i see, 64kb. i suppose it’s the best you can do from the kernel, but the problem is thinking that the problem should be solved in the kernel
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and then claiming it is solved when it’s not :)
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Replying to @comex @grsecurity
of course you're welcome to prove us wrong but if beating RAP's taking this long, i'm not holding my breath here either ;).

Jun 21, 2017 · 9:03 PM UTC

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Replying to @paxteam @grsecurity
to be clear, you are claiming that there are zero stack jumping vulnerabilities in common programs that can be exploited with PaX?
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because you know perfectly well that’s not true, even though I’m happy to admit that a large percentage of scenarios are saved by PaX