Reminding a group of us about Linux/UNIX culture/best practice: “Anything you do more than once, you script. Anything that takes more than one line, you don’t use bash for.” - @Mike_Poor
Can't really go by client base, it's more of a function of nodes to be protected and volumes of data to be ingested. For a reasonable size enterprise you're looking at maybe US$1-2mil plus recurring licensing costs at 20%/yr, and you have to staff it or hire an MSP to run it.
Depends on the environment we find, but it's often a significant buy. 2FA, Log collection/analysis, EDR, plus upgrade costs and professional services. Note that we generally do not directly profit here, we just recommend.
I get it. And a lot of IT organizations are toxic in this way and nothing I say at the outset is going to help. If this is you, I've been there too and I'm sorry you find yourself in this position.
Backups will definitely aid in recovery. They won't stop the ransomware from being implanted. And they won't stop the org from paying the ransom in order to avoid sensitive data being leaked.
Welcome to my world as a third-party incident responder. Even bringing my team in can be viewed as a message from management that the current IT staff is not trusted to handle the incident.
We are third-party IR, but our job is not to tell people what to do. Our job is to scope the problem and make recommendations to get orgs operational ASAP. This includes discovery of point of entry, where the attackers are in the network, and what they took.
Sure, nobody likes the hired guns from outside. Especially when those outsiders are telling management exactly what the local team has been saying for years. There’s a whole other thread about de-escalating that conflict.