Facebook is on the edge of implementing a disastrous decision. It must change its mind. wp.me/p16n9D-2yH
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Security, privacy & safety form the three legs of the stool. When 1 key pillar is undermined, the stool falls over. E2E encryption may be the direction but what steps are being taken to continue the fight against online child exploitation & to ensure that battle isn’t undermined?
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The challenge is you want airtight E2E encryption for activists and journalists operating in repressive countries, but that makes it more difficult if you rely on surveillance to combat criminal activity. Yet surveillance capabilities can be compromised by foreign adversaries.
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No. The question is do you want to retain the ability to detect known illegal content? Nothing more. Nothing less. Moreover encryption does nothing to shield or disguise location data or other key bits of communications info that can be derived from Facebook's apps.
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Replying to @johnc1912 @tweetinjules
There’s a cost of harm to not having E2E encryption. Perhaps fighting CSAM outweighs those risks, but they do exist and are not addressed by exclusively framing the decision based solely on access to illegal content.

Jun 26, 2019 · 5:49 PM UTC

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Replying to @bilcorry @tweetinjules
photoDNA can only see matches to hashes in its data set. It is literally blind to everything else so in no sense can it be said that detecting csam in this way threatens anybody's legitimate privacy interests. Moreover E2E encryption does nothing about commnications metadata.
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Facebook can still run hashes against photoDNA prior to encryption. E2E encryption and photoDNA are not mutually exclusive.